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Herbert W. Briggs 
In the PELEUS War Crimes Trial, the 
British judge advocate characterized 
"customary international law" as: 
"nothing but a body of rules and 
customs, expressing the common sense 
of civilized nations." I would like to 
make my first parenthetical remark at 
this point by saying that I have been 
tremendously impressed by' the com-
mon sense approach of the draft Law 
Instructions for Naval Warfare. 
The PELEUS, a Greek tramp 
freighter of some 8,800 tons, with a 
crew of thirty-five British, Greek, 
Egyptian, Chinese, Chilean, Russian and 
Polish, was under British charter. She 
was torpedoed in the South Atlantic at 
about 7:00 P.M. on the evening of 
March 13, 1944, on the way from 
Freetown to Argentina. She was tor-
pedoed by a German submarine, the 
U-852, with Captain Heinz Eck as com-
mander, and she went down immedi-
ately. 
A few survivors managed to get on 
rafts or wreckage. The sub was surfaced 
at all times and, after picking up the 
ship's third officer and a rating for 
questioning, returned them to a raft, 
steamed away, about a thousand meters, 
and then returned and fired intermit-
tently on the survivors with machine 
guns for a period of five hours, with 
some of the officers actually throwing 
hand grenades. Three men survived the 
attempt to exterminate them and were 
picked up on April 20, five or six weeks 
later, by a )?ortuguese freighter. 
The submarine was later captured-
on May 2, 1945-after having been 
beached off Somaliland as a result of a 
British air attack. The U-boat's log, with 
German thoroughness, recorded the 
sinking of the PELEUS. 
The captain, the first officer, the 
chief engineer, the ship's doctor (or the 
medical officer) and a rating were in-
dicted before a British military tribunal 
sitting in Hamburg, Germany, in Oc-
tober, 1945. They were indicted on a 
charge not of unlawful sinking but of 
committing a war crime: namely, that in 
violation of the laws and usages of war 
they were concerned in the killing of 
members of the crew of the PELEUS, 
allied nationals, by firing and throwing 
grenades at them. 
The captain did not plead the de-
fense of "superior orders." Despite 
secret orders, which had been given to 
all U-boat commanders leaving Kiel 
after September, 1942 (and I quote a 
copy which was found): "rescue runs 
counter to the rudimentary demands of 
warfare for the destruction of enemy 
ships and crews," it is ambiguous-.with 
reference to the treatment of surviving 
crewmen. 
There was an attempt in the Donitz 
trial, of the major Nuremberg criminals, 
to get the official text of this but the 
charge against Donitz, based on this 
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order, was dropped. I will read it again. 
The words are ambiguous. The instruc-
tions were given orally to all submarine 
commanders. The commander-and pos-
sibly the first officer-knew the content 
of the secret instructions and others 
were aware (according to the evidence 
that came out in the trial) that there 
were secret instructions, but they did 
not know the.ir content. "Rescue runs 
counter to the rudimentary demands of 
warfare for the destruction of enemy 
ships and crews. " 
The captain's defense was "opera-
tional necessity, " and a denial-in 
which all defendants joined-of trying 
to kill the survivors. It seemed that 
they were merely trying to destroy the 
wreckage because four of Germany's 
newest, shiniest submarines had gone 
down in that area in the preceding 
months. 
In remaining at the place of sinking, 
the submarine lost over five (5) hours. 
The testimony showed that she could go 
eighteen (18) knots on the surface at 
night. The captain, after having the 
members of the crew and officers fire 
on the wreckage for about five hours, 
got underway and then went below to 
broadcast to, as he testified, "a some-
what restive crew." He reminded them 
that allied aviators were bombing inno-
cent German women and children-
perhaps their wives and children. At the 
trial, he was asked why it was necessary 
to make this broadcast if he had only 
been firing at bits of wreckage. 
The first officer had protested to the 
captain against the shooting and pointed 
out that it was a violation of interna-
tional law. He went below, made out a 
report of interrogatories which he had 
had with the third officer of the sunken 
ship, came back up and found a seaman 
using a machine gun and firing at bits of 
wreckage. He grabbed the machine gun 
from the sailor and he, himself, fired. 
He was asked at the trial why he did 
this. He said: "Well, this man had an 
illegitimate child and I did not want to 
see those people killed by a person of 
such a bad character. " 
So far as the doctor was concerned, 
he was asked if he did not know that 
this was contrary to the rules of naval 
warfare. He said: "Yes." 
They then asked: "Why did you 
fire?" 
The doctor replied: "Well, it was our 
first kill-and it was all very exciting." 
For the benefit of a court, which 
included British and Greek naval offi-
cers, the British judge advocate summed 
up in part as follows: 
You should be in no way em-
barrassed or put out by the 
alleged complications of interna-
tional law, which it has been 
suggested surround such a case as 
this. International law is nothing 
but a body of rules which have 
been expressed in treaties, or of 
customs and usages which express 
the common sense of civilized 
nations. All of those rules and 
usages are based upon the dictates 
of ordinary humanity. It is a 
fundamental usage of war that the 
killing of unarmed enemies is for-
bidden. It is forbidden as a result 
of the experience of civilized 
nations throughout many centu-
ries. To fire so as to kill helpless 
survivors of a torpedoed ship is a 
grave breach against the law of 
nations. The right to punish per-
sons who break such rules of war 
has equally been recognized for 
many years. 
Defendants other than the captain 
pleaded the defense of "superior 
orders." On this point, the judge advo-
cate said this: 
It is quite obvious that no sailor 
nor no soldier can carry with him 
a library of international law, or 
have immediate access to a pro-
fessor in that subject who can tell 
him whether or not a particular 
command is a lawful one. But 
members of the Armed Forces are 
bound to obey lawful orders only, 
and it must have been obvious to 
the most rudimentary intelligence 
that the carrying out of Captain 
Heinz Eck's commands involved 
the killing of helpless survivors 
and was, therefore, not a lawful 
command. 
The court, basing its opinion some-
what upon the Llandovery Castle case-
in which, during the First World War, a 
German Crimes Court, sitting in Leipzig 
after the war, had convicted an officer 
and a sailor of a German submarine for 
torpedoing a hospital ship and then 
firing upon survivors in lifeboats (some 
of them did get away)-found all five 
(5) defendants guilty. The captain, the 
first officer and the medical officer were 
sentenced to death by shooting, which 
was carried out within three weeks. The 
chief engineer and the rating were sen-
tenced to life imprisonment and to 
fifteen (15) years, respectively, the plea 
of "superior order" having been allowed 
in mitigation of sentence although not 
as a complete defense against responsi-
bility for the crime. 
I might point out that the fifteen 
(15) volumes of reported War Crimes 
Trials, which were published by the 
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 
stress this point in the concluding vol-
ume: that "superior orders" is not a 
defense, but may be considered in miti-
gation of sentence (the same as stated in 
your draft of Naval Instructions). 
These applications of the law of 
nations, that is of the common sense of 
civilized nations, have sometimes ap-
peared easier to perform in practice 
than the theory of the position of the 
individual in international law might 
suggest. Doctrinal disputes of almost 
bitter intensity have raged over the 
question of legal theory as to whether 
or not the individual human being is a 
subject of international law. 
On the one hand it has been argued 
(and this is the orthodox view) that 
only collective entities, such as States or 
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organizations of States (like the United 
Nations), can be subject to the rights 
and duties of international law. That is 
what we mean by "subject of intern a-
tionallaw"-one is subject to the rights 
and the obligations of international law. 
On the other hand it has been 
asserted that all law exists to regulate 
human conduct; that States and organi-
zations of States can act only through 
individuals; and that, therefore, many of 
the rules of international law are de-
signed to regulate the conduct of indi-
viduals-whether they are acting as 
individuals or as agents and officers of 
the States. 
I am not too concerned about the 
doctrinal disputes. We all agree that 
much of international law is designed to 
require or prohibit certain behavior, or 
to further certain processes and pro-
cedures. Whether the principles and 
rules of international law bear directly 
on individuals or only indirectly-
through the incorporation of these rules 
of international law into national naval 
or army regulations, for example-may 
appear important in legal theory. How-
ever, these considerations may be im-
material in a practical sense if the 
purposes of the law are fulfilled. 
For example: in the absence of 
. treaties, international.law establishes no 
right for the individual to leave his 
country of origin, to enter a foreign 
country, and to become naturalized 
-there or to divest himself of his original 
nationality. This is only another way of 
saying that the individual has under 
international law, in the absence of 
treaties, no right of emigration, im-
migration, naturalization or expatria-
tion. Nor would the individual neces-
sarily have anyone of these rights even 
if we labeled him a "subject of interna-
tional law." Why? If he acquires any of 
these rights to change his nationality, to 
leave his country to enter another coun-
try, the rightsicome to him either from 
the law of his domicile or from the law 
of his nationality; that is, he derives 
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them directly from the place of resi-
dence or from the law of the nationality 
which he possesses. 
It may be that the State of his 
domicile, as an alien, and the State of 
his nationality have concluded a treaty, 
stipulating benefits on his behalf as a 
citizen of one State and a resident of 
another. In such a case it makes little 
practical difference whether the treaty 
stipulations are referred to as the 
"treaty rights of aliens under intern a-
tionallaw," or as the "obligations of the 
State under international law to grant 
certain rights to aliens under national 
law." In civilized countries, the alien 
will have the procedural capacity to 
seek in the local courts the benefits 
which are stipulated in his behalf by the 
treaty. 
The common sense of civilized 
nations finds comparable expression 
with reference to what is called the 
"delictual capacity of individuals under 
international law." For example, there 
is the liability of the individual for the 
commission of war crimes. You may 
agree with the dictum of the Nuremberg 
War Crimes Tribunal that crimes against 
international law are committed by 
men-not by abstract entities; or, you 
may plausibly argue that war crimes, 
and so-called "offenses against the law 
of nations," are in legal theory viola-
tions of national regulations which in-
corporate by reference the requirements 
of international law. 
Support for this interpretation can 
be found in Hague Convention IV of 
1907. By Article 2 of that treaty, the 
annexed Hague Regulations Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
apply "between Contracting Powers"; 
that is, they are legally binding on 
States. Article I requires that: "The 
Contracting Powers shall issue instruc-
tions to their armed land forces which 
shall be in conformity with the Regula-
tions .... "; that is, the States which are 
bound by the Hague Regulations as 
international law shall transform the 
provisions· of those regulations into 
national regulations, binding upon indi-
vidual members of the armed forces. 
Thus, whichever legal theory is adopted, 
international law and national laws and 
regulations are in agreement in stipu-
lating that war crimes-that is, violations 
of the laws and customs of war-are acts 
entailing individual criminal liability. 
From the point of view of the individual 
member of the armed forces the practi-
cal position is that certain conduct is 
forbidden by the rules of warfare. He 
knows that the courts will have jurisdic-
tion to try him-and even to impose the 
death penalty-for conviction of vio-
lating the laws and customs of war. 
The fifteen (15) volumes of the 
United Nations War Crimes Trials, based 
upon decisions of the last war, indicate 
that the death penalty was given only in 
cases of murder and rape. There may 
have been one or two exceptions but in 
most cases, although it is possible to 
give the death penalty for any war crime 
upon conviction, the practice was to 
limit it to serious offenses. I have 
noticed that the draft regulations of 
both the Army and the Navy talk about 
"grave offenses" rather than any 
violation of the laws of war. Any 
violation of the laws of war might be 
considered an illegal act, but not all of 
them are considered of such a heinous 
character as to warrant the death 
penalty. 
The courts before which the indi-
vidual member of the armed forces can 
be tried may be national military courts 
or international military tribunals, set 
up as such through international agree-
ment between States. Although pro-
cedural law will vary in different courts 
between different national courts, and 
as between international courts and 
national courts, the substantive content 
of the law which all of these courts 
(national and international) will apply 
will be quite the same: the traditionally 
accepted laws and customs of war. 
The jurisdiction which international 
law permits States to exercise over 
persons charged with war crimes is 
broad and comprehensive. It has some-
times been stated as follows: -"Interna-
tional law obligates States to exercise 
jurisdiction over their own nationals for 
war crimes and authorizes them to try 
and punish certain enemy nations for 
violations of the laws of war. " However, 
such jurisdiction is not limited to na-
tionals and enemy nationals. 
Following the Second World War, the 
United States military courts tried and 
convicted Spanish, Dutch and Yugoslav 
citizens (the Spanish, at least, were 
neutrals) for violations of the laws of 
war. British military courts similarly 
convicted Swiss and Danish citizens. 
French military courts convicted Poles, 
Belgians, Italians, Luxembourgers, 
Frenehmen, and, of course, Germans. 
An interesting situation arose in the 
Paeific. The transcript of the trial is not 
reported in these volumes but there is a 
summary, which I will quote: 
In the trial of one Shimio, of 
the Japanese Army, before a 
British military court sitting at 
Singapore, the accused was 
charged, found guilty, and sen-
tenced to death by hanging by a 
court consisting of British officers 
only, for having unlawfully killed 
American prisoners of war In 
French Indo-China. 
In other words, the place where the 
crime was committed was French terri-
tory; the nationals injured were Ameri-
cans; and the court was made up exclu-
sively of British officers. 
Mr. Willard B. Cowles, who is now 
the Assistant Legal Adviser of the De-
partment of State, has concluded, after 
a study of jurisdiction over war crimes, 
that every independent State has juris-
diction to punish war criminals in its 
custody-regardless of the nationality of 
the victim, the nationality of the per-
petrator, or the place where the offense 
was committed. Physical custody of the 
accused, rather than any principle of the 
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territoriality of criminal law, seems to 
be the jurisdictional criterion. Of course 
some States have limited the jurisdiction 
of their own national courts so as not to 
take full benefit of this principle of 
universality. 
There was a case of one Wagner, who 
was tried and acquitted before a French 
military court, where evidence showed 
that he had committed a war crime. But 
that war crime had not been one listed 
in the French Penal Code and the 
particular tribunal had been authorized 
to try persons only where there was a 
concordance between international law 
and French national law. So in this case 
he escaped on a technicality. 
I have no reliable statistics, and I 
have not been able to get any, on the 
number of persons tried and convicted 
on charges of war crimes. However, of 
the fifteen (15) volumes published by 
the United Nations War Crimes Commis-
sion, the last volume (published in 
1949) states that the Commission had 
received the transcripts of 1,911 trial 
records-an admittedly incomplete list, 
since some States had not complied 
with the request for sending in tran-
scripts. I understand that this figure 
may even be off by as much as 1,000. In 
other words, we know that there were 
1,911 trials, but there may have been 
one thousand other war crimes trials 
following the Second World War in 
which transcripts were not sent to the 
Commission. It is important to note 
that these 1,911 trials dealt with war 
crimes in the traditional sense of the 
term: namely, violations of the laws and 
customs of war. The fifteen (15 volumes 
of Law Reports present a selected 
number of 89 trials and there are 
penetrating legal analyses of the cases 
which have been appended by Mr. 
George Brand, a British lawyer. If there 
is little novelty in the findings of these 
courts, it may be because, as one writer 
has said, "all the offenses of any im-
portance which the term "war crime" 
properly denotes are old and well 
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known in the law of war." The facts 
may differ, but the offenses are not 
new. In any case, this collection pro-
vides a substantial body of new case law 
on traditional war crimes. 
The novelty of the Nuremberg Trial 
of the major war criminals lay not in its 
proceedings and findings with reference 
to traditional war crimes, but in certain 
other features. Of the major war crimi-
nals convicted at Nuremberg, all except 
three were found guilty of traditional 
war crimes. Why, then, did it appear 
necessary or desirable to indict the 
major war criminals at Nuremberg and 
at Tokyo for crimes against peace and 
crimes against humanity? Most of the 
latter were subsumed under war crimes, 
anyway, and they were more often than 
not identical. The answer appears to lie in 
political rather than legal considerations. 
A group of crusaders (this is a value-
judgment and there are some people 
who feel strongly that that is not the 
term which should be used to describe 
them, but I am giving my own opinion on 
it) set out to establish "aggressive war" 
as a crime under international law and 
to establish individual criminal liability 
theref!Jre ex post facto, which is also a 
conclusion that I am drawing. It was 
easy enough to secure agreement to the 
phrases in the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, which is an-
nexed to the London Agreement of 
August 8, 1945. In Article 6, for ex-
ample (you are familiar with this, but I 
will read it anyway): "The following 
acts, or anyone of them, are crimes 
coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal for which there shall be indi-
vidual criminal responsibility." Then, 
they list the categories: "crimes against 
peace, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, the common plan or con-
spiracy. " 
I would like to quote the first one-
Crimes Against Peace-from paragraph 
(a) of Article VI of the London Charter: 
Crimes Against Peace; namely, 
planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a war of aggression, 
or a war in violation of interna-
tional treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for 
the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing. 
I think that the evidence shows these 
provisions were rather hastily drafted. I 
think they may have been drafted with 
dangerous haste. Let me examine for a 
moment some of the words (I will leave 
out some of the words, but I will read 
only words which are incorporated in 
the provisions in order to give you an 
example). 
You are engaged here in the planning 
and the preparation, not of a war of 
aggression, but of possible tactics and 
strategy in a situation against Country 
"X" or Country "Y." You are not 
planning a war of aggression; you are 
not planning a war in violation of a 
treaty. But suppose that we should get 
involved with Communist China in hos-
tilities (we don't have to lose the war). 
One of you mIght be picked up and 
charged with the following, based on 
Paragraph (a) (Crimes Against Peace): 
namely, that at the Naval War College, 
Newport, Rhode Island, you planned or 
prepared a war in violation of interna-
tional assurances. The assurances might 
be one by Mr. Dulles saying that we are 
not going to attaek them or it might be 
one by Mr. Walter Robertson. Of 
course, I am giving you a hypothetical 
case. I should add that the Nuremberg 
Tribunal did not apply these provisions 
in this way-they did not try to convict 
people merely on the "planning" and 
"preparation." They went on to the 
"initiation" of the war, which was one 
of the main points they tried to prove, 
and also the "waging of a war of 
aggression. "What I am suggesting is that 
leaving on the books vague terms like 
the planning or preparation of a war in 
which you might happen to be a pris-
oner may lead your captors to say: "At 
the Naval War College did you not plan 
and did you not go to war in violation 
of assurances?" The words are twisted 
by your captors, but that is not the 
point. 
Agreement to these terms. was 
secured from twenty-three (23) States 
(the original drafters and nineteen (19) 
other States agreed to them) at London 
prior to the Nuremberg Trial. After the 
trial, Justice Robert H. Jackson, who 
had been the Chief Counsel for the 
United States in the prosecution of the 
major German war criminals, observed: 
"The Nuremberg Trial avoided wrangles 
over definitions and deals with the 
clean-cut challenge: Is it a crime to 
make a war of aggression?" 
It was somewhat disconcerting to 
find Justice Jackson writing two pages 
later: "This question-whether it is a 
crime to conduct a war of aggression-is 
not technically an issue in the trial 
itself, having been foreclosed by the 
specific terms of the London Agree-
ment. " 
Two questions of at least possible 
interest to international lawyers were 
apparently not decided by the Court, 
namely: (1) whether aggressive war was 
an international crime prior to the 
London Agreement of 1945; and, (2), 
whether, if it was a crime before 1945, 
there existed in law at the time the acts 
charged were committed individual 
criminal liability therefor on the part of 
agents of the aggressive State. 
What do I mean by saying "whether 
there existed in law?" It is obvious that 
there did not exist in German law any 
provisions making illegal the "planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a 
war of aggression, or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances .... " The question was: Was 
there any other system of law which 
applied? That threw the Court back to 
international law in an attempt to dis-
cover whether international law had 
made aggressive war a crime at the time 
the acts were committed-not later, but 
at the time the acts were committed. 
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However, the Tribunal consistently 
held, in its judgment of October 1, 
1946, that it was bound by the London 
Charter, which "is decisive and binding 
upon the Tribunal" and "the law to be 
applied in the case. " Although the court 
stated that it was not strictly necessary 
to consider whether, or to what extent, 
aggressive war was a crime before the 
London Agreement of 1945, the court 
sought obiter dictum-that is, it was 
unnecessary intellectual exercise; they 
sought to establish that aggressive war 
was not only illegal but criminal prior to 
the London Charter. The evidence was 
weak-a series of unratified draft 
treaties and declaratory or declamatory 
resolutions, some of which had been 
passed by the League of Nations, none 
of which laid down the law, none of 
which ever came into force, and none of 
which ever acquired any legal signifi-
cance of a binding nature upon the 
behavior of States or of individuals. 
There was left the Kellogg Pact, 
which, even if it made certain wars 
illegal-and people have asserted that it 
did make some wars illegal, but that, in 
my judgment, is doubtful because of the 
extensive right of self-defense as deter-
mined by the State employing it and the 
so-called "reservations" which preceded 
its enactment-certainly contained no 
provisions establishing the criminality of 
aggressive war or the individual liability 
of those who initiate or wage it. 
The net result has been that the 
justifiable findings of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal on traditional crimes have been 
overshadowed by a polemical contro-
versy as to what the Nuremberg Trial 
really established and as to its value as a 
precedent. Justice Jackson 'thought that 
certainly no future lawyer or nation, 
undertaking to prosecute crimes against 
the peace of the world, would have to 
face the argument that the effort was 
unprecedented. But Professor Hans 
Kelsen, one of the world's great jurists, 
has elaborately questioned whether in a 
legal sense the trial constitutes any 
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precedent at all, since, as he says, it was 
a case in which a specially-created court 
applied specially-created law to a desig-
nated group of people, most of whom 
(happily for us) have now expired. The 
precedentary value-that is, the value of 
Nuremherg as a precedent-can he left 
in aheyance and if States wish to estah-
lish the Nuremherg principles as the 
international law for future application 
they are entitled to do so, without 
proving that this was decided at Nurem-
herg. 
Attempts to do this have heen zeal-
ously pursued hy representatives of cer-
tain States in the United Nations. The 
project has taken two forms: (1) the 
attempt to estahlish a permanent inter-
national criminal court; and, (2) the 
attempt to estahlish a hody of inter-
national criminal law for that court to 
apply. Understandahly, the attempts to 
create the law have preceded the at-
tempts to set up a court to apply the 
law. 
In a hroad sense, the formulation of 
a hody of international criminal law has 
heen pursued along three related lines: 
(1) a code, formulating the principles of 
international law recognized in the 
Charter and judgment of the Nuremherg 
Trihunal of the major war criminals 
(that is printed in one of the notes to 
your draft instructions); (2) a code of 
offenses against the peace and security 
of mankind; and (3) the genocide con-
vention, which entered into force (it is 
already in force) in 1951-although not 
for the United States. The genocide 
convention is not ordinarily included in 
this category, hut what I am dealing 
with here is: (1) you are trying to set up 
a court; (2) you are trying to find a 
hody of law for that court to apply-the 
hody of law will include the formula-
tion of the Nuremherg principles for the 
future and it will also include the draft 
code of offenses, if it ever goes into 
effect; (3) the genocide convention in 
effect dealt not with war crimes hut 
with what was suhsumed under the 
ruhric of crimes against humanity, and 
is comparahle to that. By the genocide 
convention the High Contracting Parties 
confirm that genocide is a crime under 
international law, which they undertake 
to prevent and punish. Whether persons 
committing it are constitutionally re-
sponsihle rulers, puhlic officials, or 
private individuals, they shall he tried 
hy a competent trihunal of the State in 
the territory of which the act was 
committed; that is to say, if this had 
heen in force twelve years ago the 
Germans would have tried Hitler for 
genocide. Or, if the Communists do not 
want to try Malenkov (mayhe I had 
hetter leave him out and say Khrush-
chev and some of the others), there is 
another ohligation: if you do not try 
your own Heads of States and rulers for 
this crime of genocide, then you are 
legally ohligated to suhmit this man to 
an international court if there is such a 
court and if you have accepted the 
jurisdiction of that court. I am not 
distressed hecause the United States has 
not ratified the genocide convention 
he cause it seems to me, although it does 
estahlish a principle in Article 1 that 
genocide is an evil thing, that the other 
terms appear to be almost fraudulent. I 
shall say nothing more ahout this third 
category hecause it is estahlished, a 
great many States have ratified this 
convention. 
Still dealing with the establishment 
of a hody of international criminal law , 
the formulation of the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples was intended to establish prin-
ciples of' international criminal law for 
future application so as to avoid the 
charge made at Nuremherg that the 
application of these provisions was ex 
post facto, or, that it was not law and 
the people were not individually respon-
sihle under that non-existent law at the 
time of the Trial. The formulation was 
entrusted to the United Nations Interna-
tional Law Commission, which, after 
some dehate, declined to express any 
opinion as to the legal character of the 
Nuremberg judgment and prineiples; 
that is to say, they deliberately refused 
to deeide or to express an opinion as to 
whether or not the Nuremberg Charter 
and, judgment expressed preexisting law 
before 1945,whether it created new law 
as of 1945, or whether they had estab-
lished a law for the future. 
The Nuremberg Principles, formu-
lated by the United Nations Interna-
tional Law Commission, consisted 
largely of a mere restatement of prin-
ciples found in the London Charter and 
the Nuremberg judgment. When the 
Second Report of the International Law 
Commission containing this formulation 
went to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1950, doctrinal 
battles were reopened in the Legal 
Committee of the Assembly over the 
question as to whether the Nuremberg 
Principles accurately expressed existing 
international law. The General As-
sembly, without expressing any opinion 
on this question, invited the govern-
ments of Members of the United 
Nations to make observation on the 
International Law Commission's draft. 
They requested the Commission to take 
into account the governments' observa-
tions when it prepared its second code-
the Draft Code of Offenses Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind. Of sixty 
(60) governments requested to make 
observations on the International Law 
Commission's draft, only seven (7) had 
sufficient interest to reply. Of these 
seven, only the French and Lebanese 
replies contained detailed observations 
of any value. That is to say, fifty-three 
(53) States did not even reply and 
fifty-eight (58) did not send in any 
comments of value. 
The International Law Commission, 
at the request of the General Assembly, 
has also formulated and reformulated a 
Draft Code of Offenses Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind. The 
contents of this draft code are in part an 
elaboration of some of the Nuremberg 
Principles, but they go beyond the 
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Nuremberg Principles in treating geno-
cide, certain forms of intervention by 
one State in the affairs of another State, 
certain terrorist activities fostered by 
one State against another, and illegal 
annexation of another State's territory, 
as crimes under international law for 
which the responsible individuals shall 
be punished. 
Although delegates of some of the 
countries argue that this is already 
international law, there is an over-
whelming expression of opinion in the 
United Nations' organs that these are 
not international law-that they could 
become such if enacted in a treaty and 
if the treaty were ratified. Some of 
them have argued that it is highly 
desirable that this should be done. But I 
would like to point out that some of 
these principles are not an expression of 
existing international law any more than 
the Nuremberg principles were. 
At its Ninth Session, in 1954, the 
General Assembly decided to postpone 
further discussion of the draft code 
until after a special committee had 
reported on a more basic question, 
namely: How is aggression defined? 
There have been three (3) committees 
on this subject and there is a history 
that goes back to the days of the League 
of Nations. The be~t definition that I 
have ever seen of "aggression" was one 
which Maxim Litvinoff, the Soviet Com-
missar for Foreign Affairs, introduced 
into the League of Nations before the 
Soviets invaded the Baltic States. It was 
about as good a definition as I think 
you can get. 
Again, there has been quite a doc-
trinal debate as to how to go about the 
definition. Should one enumerate that 
the following things are aggression and 
list them: A, B, C, D, E, et cetera? Or, if 
that is done, will some new techniques 
of the "cold war" be forgotten? There-
fore, some people argue to set up a 
general formula which will say that acts 
of a certain kind in certain relationships 
are aggression, while others say that one 
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cannot in advance formulate a hard-
and-fast definition. But, pending an-
other try by another committee (I 
believe it is the third) of the United 
Nations to formulate a definition of 
"aggression," they have laid on the shelf 
the reformulation of Offenses Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind. 
Discussion of the establishment of a 
proposed International Criminal Court 
has likewise been postponed. There have 
been two Commissions of the United 
Nations dealing with this and they have 
come up with somewhat differing texts 
(some of you have read them). They are 
very elaborate, and, again, they are not 
an expression of existing law. They are 
an attempt to devise a court and deal 
with its jurisdiction. Buf that question 
has been postponed; the question of the 
Code on Offenses Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind has been post-
poned; and the Nuremberg Principles 
are dormant, as far as immediate action 
is concerned, because States have not 
shown sufficient interest in their formu-
lation. 
Professor Jean Spiropoulos, the 
Greek member of the Sixth Committee, 
and a member also of the International 
Law Commission, may not have been 
far wrong when he observed !hat it will 
be "a long time" before the General 
Assembly takes up again the question of 
establishing an International Criminal 
Court. 
Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, the Legal 
Adviser of the British Foreign Office 
and the British representative in the 
Sixth Committee, observed in the Com-
mittee that such a court (the proposed 
International Criminal Court) could 
consider only two types of crimes: (1) 
traditional war crimes; and, (2), the 
non-traditional Nuremberg offenses, or 
the Offenses Against Peace and Se-
curity. The former, traditional war 
crimes, will probably be dealt with in 
future wars by national or international 
military tribunals, just as we have done 
in the past. Possibly we might add 
neutral ju~ges, but it seems unlikely 
that persons charged with traditional 
war crimes would be sent to this new 
court for it would be inconvenient-you 
would have to have a location some-
where and they would be tried all over 
the world, just as they have been. It was 
unfortunate, but the General Assembly 
should face realistically the fact that it 
would be possible to bring to justice 
after a war only war criminals of de-
feated countries. Therefore, the 
proposed permanent International 
Criminal Court, in the British view, 
would be dealing only with the second 
category-Offenses Against the Peace of 
Mankind-which have not been clearly 
formulated and for which, moreover, 
governments would be unlikely to sur-
render persons to be tried unless the 
countries were defeated. The British 
view was, therefore, that it is all right to 
talk about the court-but they took a 
rather dim view of it. 
Where, then, do we stand with regard 
to the position of the individual in 
international law? The prospects of 
establishing a permanent International 
Criminal Court, with adequate jurisdic-
tion to try individuals for violations of 
international law, are remote; nor are 
the prospects for agreement upon a 
Code of International Criminal Law 
much healthier. Some of the provisions 
of the draft Code of Offenses Against 
the Peace of Mankind are so far-fetched 
that they have not even been able to 
command the support of international 
lawyers, let alone governments. The 
formulation of the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples is far from general acceptance as a 
statement of existing international law. 
In civilized countries, the individual will 
continue to benefit from the standards 
established by international law for his 
protection, and he will continue to be 
individually liable for traditional war 
crimes whether or not we confer upon 
him the label "subject of international 
law." In time, the common sense of 
civilized nations may come to establish 
more adequate convenants for the pro-
tection of human rights and it may 
come to establish individual responsi-
bility for aggressive war. 
The late Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes once transfixed a colleague of 
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mine, Professor Carl Becker, and sud-
denly demanded: "What do you think 
of the prospects of the human race?" 
Professor Becker, a gentle scholar, 
replied: "I wish them well, but I am not 
overly sanguine. " 
----'f1----
